Vn Bravo Times
Iceal Hambleton, whose call sign was Bat 21 Bravo, c. 1973 The rescue of Bat 21 Bravo, the for, a navigator aboard an aircraft shot down behind North Vietnamese, was the 'largest, longest, and most complex ' operation during the. Five additional aircraft were shot down during rescue attempts, directly resulting in the deaths of 11 airmen, the capture of two others, and another airman trying to evade capture. On April 2, 1972, the, the largest operation of the entire Vietnam War, was in its third day. An early morning flight of two EB-66 aircraft was led by Bat 20, piloted by Lt. Robert Singletary. Hambleton was a aboard Bat 21.
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The rescue of Bat 21 Bravo. Rosebeary in his Cobra Blue Ghost 28 responded with rockets and 40mm fire but both helicopters were struck multiple times. Information about the time zone abbreviation B – Bravo Time Zone - where it is observed and when it is observed.
The two aircraft were escorting a cell of three. Bat 21 was configured to gather, including identifying North Vietnamese anti-aircraft radar installations to enable. Bat 21 was destroyed by an and Hambleton was the only survivor, parachuting behind the front lines into a battlefield filled with thousands of soldiers. A 42nd TEWS Douglas EB-66E Destroyer at,.
Hambleton had access to operations and was an expert in. The may have possessed information about his presence in Vietnam and his capture would have meant a huge intelligence bonanza for the Soviet Union. Hambleton and 1st Lt. Mark Clark, who was shot down during rescue operations, were finally recovered from behind the front lines on two different nights in daring, covert, night-time rescues carried out by U.S. And commandos. For their actions in rescuing the two men, Norris was awarded the and VNN Petty Officer Nguyen Van Kiet was recognized with the. Nguyen was the only South Vietnamese naval officer given that award during the war.
The Air Force did not put limits on what it took to rescue a downed airman. The direct and indirect cost of rescuing Hambleton was enormous and became a watershed event in Air Force search and rescue.
To prevent incidents, the Americans imposed a standard no-fire zone within a 27 kilometers (17 mi) radius of Hambleton and diverted aircraft to aid in his rescue. It is likely that South Vietnamese soldiers indirectly died as a result of their inability to obtain fire support.: 120 The added deaths, loss of aircraft, and length of the rescue operation led the USAF to change the way they planned and conducted search and rescue missions. As a result, they developed new techniques and equipment to improve their ability to rescue downed airmen. The or Nguyen Hue Offensive of 1972 At the time of Bat 21's mission, American combat forces had been vastly reduced in under President 's policy. The (NVA) launched the Nguyen Hue Offensive against the and U.S.
Military on Friday, March 30, 1972. It was their largest attack of the war and was timed to take full advantage of the bad weather typical during, offering low clouds and poor visibility. About 30,000 heavily equipped: 71 troops from the 304th and and three separate infantry regiments of the B5 Front crossed the into zone across the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. In the 8 kilometers (5.0 mi) area between the Cam Lo Bridge and Bridge, the NVA were supported by two tank regiments of 150 Soviet and tanks, 75 tracked, an artillery regiment of 47 towed, and the largest concentration of anti-aircraft weaponry of the entire war, including the advanced SA-2 surface-to-air missile. Their main line of advance was along the axis of the north-south national highway QL-1. When General ' headquarters in Saigon learned of large NVA movement south of the DMZ, a number of B-52s had been sent on ' missions without escort, but were experiencing significantly increased SAM activity. The (42 TEWS) was tapped for assistance.
The draw down of troops had left the unit shorthanded and Hambleton was the senior officer among a group of senior navigators.: 6 Hambleton assigned himself as navigator on the older EB-66C, which was configured to gather. The newer EB-66E was tasked with jamming (SAM) radar guidance systems so their missiles could not accurately target the aircraft. The EB-66's mission was to troll for missiles, let them lock on to their aircraft, and then execute a SAM break, a violent turn and dive designed to throw off the pursuing missile.: 49: 69 The SA-2 was the size of a telephone pole and carried a proximity fused warhead that was lethal within about 150 feet (46 m), but their guidance systems failed at about 2, while the EB-66 could achieve 5 Gs in its avoidance maneuver. The crew had successfully pulled a SAM break more than 100 times. The presence of North Vietnamese surface-to-air missiles south of the DMZ had been tracked by Hambleton, but not everyone agreed they were present that far south.: 74 Aircraft shot down. North Vietnamese personnel scramble to ready an SA-2 missile to engage American aircraft. On Easter Sunday, April 2, 1972, two ( Bat 21 and Bat 22) were flying pathfinder escort for a cell of three, which were given assignments to bomb or the Ban Karai Pass, the two primary access routes to the through Laos.
Hambleton was aboard Bat 21, EB-66C serial number 54-0466, over, Vietnam, just south of the between North and South Vietnam. The airmen were surprised by the intensity of the anti-aircraft fire and SAM activity.: 27 The NVA 365th Air Defense Division fired two volleys of SA-2 at the U.S. Planes, but the EB-66s successfully thwarted the first volley. The NVA pointed their radar at the B-52s, targeting them unsuccessfully with radar guided anti-aircraft fire.
When those missed, the NVA fired two more SAMs optically at Bat 21, only turning on the guidance and radar system after the missiles were launched, which delayed the targeted aircraft's ability to detect and avoid them. When the aircraft crew spotted the missiles, the pilot assumed they had as usual been fired from north of the DMZ. He began a SAM break to the south, away from the direction he assumed the missiles had been fired. One of the called 'Negative! , and the pilot flipped the plane over on its other wing. This time the pilot was unable to evade the missiles. The first missile exploded immediately beneath the aircraft striking it at 29,000 feet (8,800 m).
Hambleton, whose was Bat 21 Bravo,: 30 was positioned immediately behind the pilot, who gave the signal for everyone to eject. Hambleton pulled the handles and had a moment to make eye contact with the pilot as his seat rocketed out of the dying plane. A moment later, the aircraft was struck by a second SA-2 and exploded.: 75: 71 The remainder of the aircraft's six-man crew— Wayne L.
Bolte, pilot; Robin F. Gatwood, co-pilot; and Anthony R. Giannangeli, Charles A.
Levis, and Henry M. Serex —were unable to eject and were listed as. Their remains were never found. Hambleton was due for some, and his wife Gwen was planning to meet him in Thailand the next week. She received airplane tickets for her trip on the same day that her husband was shot down.
Instead of going to the airport, she collapsed after seeing an Air Force officer and a chaplain walk up her sidewalk. Surrounded by North Vietnamese. For more details on this topic, see. Had more than 20 years of military service. He had served in the as a radio operator during World War II, though not in combat. After World War II, he was recalled to active service by the USAF in the early 1950s.
During the he flew 43 combat missions as a navigator in a. He then worked during the 1960s on various USAF projects including the, and.
He had been the deputy chief of operations for the USAF Strategic Air Command before the.: 66 In April, 1972 he was reassigned from the to and to the (42 TEWS), at,. He was familiar with targeting both SAC missiles and SAC airplanes, was one of the most knowledgeable missile and electronic counter-measures experts in Vietnam, and it is likely that his situation was quickly reported to U.S.
Intelligence services. Very few Americans remained on the ground in Vietnam, and the NVA made it a point to track particularly valuable personnel, even in Thailand. The North Vietnamese were probably supported by the Russians with decrypting American message traffic and they likely knew exactly who had parachuted into their midst. This ability was likely enabled by the then unknown American spy, who had given the Soviets a radio cipher card and other high-value intelligence. Hambleton's capture would be a terrific blow to American airpower around the world and a huge prize for the North Vietnamese and indirectly, the Soviets.: 83 Hambleton said after the war that he felt sure if he were captured that he would never have been taken to Hanoi.: 84 Air rescue attempts.
An from the in 1970. Hambleton had received water survival training at Turkey Run, Florida, and training and survival basics at the Jungle Survival School in the Philippines.: 6 He had shrapnel wounds from his aircraft exploding, a ripped finger, and four compressed vertebra from the force of the ejection. Hidden in a clump of trees in his hole, surrounded by North Vietnamese less than 100 meters (330 ft) away,: 37 Hambleton decided that with only nine months to go until his retirement, he was going to survive and return home. Richard Abbot flying a FAC O-2 had been shot down offshore shortly before Hambleton, and when Abbot was picked up by the, two Air Force Douglas A-1 Skyraiders (Capt. Don Morse in Sandy 07 and his wingman in Sandy 08) from the remained in Hambleton's vicinity. The Sandys immediately scrambled to cover Hambleton's position. When Morse in Sandy 07 first got the call, he thought that, because the aircraft had gone down in South Vietnam, the SAR effort could be accomplished fairly quickly.
When he got over Hambelton's position, he was shocked at the amount of ground fire he received. It was more intense than anything he had seen in the war.: 33 Some pilots reported that the intensity of the antiaircraft fire was equal to that around.: 34 Although the U.S.
And ARVN forces did not know it yet, the offensive was the largest attack conducted by the North Vietnamese during the war. Hambleton coolly called in the coordinates of the North Vietnamese around him, watched the ordnance explode, and called in corrections to the FAC above, who relayed the information to the A-1s and the fast movers, fighter-bombers.: 79: 37 FAC pilots after the event were universally amazed at Hambleton's ability to remain calm and call in accurate fire around his position. During a combat mission in Southeast Asia in 1971. Morse called for emergency support, which was picked up by a slick (Blue Ghost 39) near Hue, piloted by 1st Lt. Byron Kulland from F Troop,. Normally based at near Da Nang, Kulland was in the area showing a photographer the developing battle.
He had on board with him Capt. Thomas White, the Troop operations officer. After depositing the photographer and White at Phu Bai airfield near, White directed Kulland to proceed north and contact the FAC (Jankowski) for information on arrival.
White also sent two Cobra gunships, Blue Ghost 28 and 24, and then added Blue Ghost 30, a second Huey. Blue Ghost 39 proceeded across the Song Meiu Giang 50 feet (15 m) above the ground towards Hambleton's position with the well-armed Blue Ghost 28 Cobra gunship following about 3,000 feet (910 m) behind and 300 feet (91 m) above. Blue Ghost 24 waited at the south side of the Song Meiu Giang for Blue Ghost 30 to catch up.: 35 As soon as Blue Ghost 39 and 28 crossed the Song Meiu Giang, Kulland and Rosebeary's aircraft were met by an immediate curtain of North Vietnamese fire from every direction, hurled against them with an intensity that defied belief.
Rosebeary in his Cobra Blue Ghost 28 responded with rockets and 40mm fire but both helicopters were struck multiple times. A during a rescue mission over Southeast Asia. Kulland flying Blue Ghost 39 tried to turn back south but only managed to crash-land his stricken aircraft, about 6.7 kilometers (4.2 mi) east of Hambleton and 0.9 miles (1.4 km) north of the river in an area full of NVA.: 35 When the helicopter smashed into the ground, the only mobile crew member was SP5 Jose Astorga, the door gunner, who had been wounded. He tried but was unable to extract other hurt crew members.
Paschall was pinned in the wreckage. Frink, who was seriously wounded, urged Astorga to get out and away from the aircraft.
A few moments later advancing North Vietnamese soldiers fired on the wreckage with automatic weapons and the aircraft's fuel cell exploded with the remainder of the crew inside. Astorga was captured but pilots 1st Lt. Byron Kulland and John Frink along with Ronald Paschall were killed.: 63 Rosebeary, flying Cobra Blue Ghost 28, called a but was able to safely exit the area and landed his severely damaged helicopter. His aircraft was totaled. He and Gunner Warrant Officer Charles Gorski were picked up by a HH-53C helicopter (Jolly Green 67), without incident.: 36 Rosebeary warned other aircraft against crossing the river. When Morse in Sandy 07 learned that the quick-snatch had failed, he and his Sandy 08 broke off engaging the North Vietnamese and returned to Da Nang. Both Sandys were found to be so damaged they would take several days to repair.: 38 At 9:00 p.m., Nail 59, a new version of the aircraft equipped with the Pave Nail radar piloted by Gary Ferentchak, took over FAC duties.
The SAR efforts were suspended for the night and the U.S. And ARVN forces remained unaware of the true strength of the NVA offensive. Advised by the FAC to remain in place, Hambleton moved to a safer spot in the jungle and dug a hole to hide in until morning. During the night, Nail 59 and King 27, an HC-130 commanded by Maj. Dennis Constant, stayed. They suddenly found themselves painted by radar and narrowly missed getting shot down as well. At 53 years old, Hambleton was not a prime candidate to survive the cold, wet weather conditions.: 251 No fire zone The Joint Search and Rescue Command (JSARC) was under the direction of the director of aerospace rescue, Col.
Cecil Muirhead, who could restrict airspace activity for the use of search and rescue forces. He also commanded all the dedicated assets needed to assist with SAR.
Muirhead ordered 24-hour (FAC) coverage around Hambleton's position to watch over him and soften up the North Vietnamese positions around him.: 39 To protect the downed airmen and the search and rescue forces, Muirhead also ordered the to establish a standard 27 kilometers (17 mi) no-fire zone around Hambleton.: 118: 68 It prohibited friendly artillery, naval gunfire, or aircraft from engaging any target in the zone without JSARC approval. Three North Vietnamese divisions were attacking and the 3rd ARVN could not reply for several hours with artillery or request tactical air strikes in the area.
More aircraft lost. A of the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron refueling from a over North Vietnam, 1969-70. On April 3, forces attempted a first light rescue which can successfully achieve surprise with minimal force. A search and rescue crew took off from the based at, Thailand. It consisted of two, Jolly Green 65 and 67, and two A-1 Skyraiders, Sandy 07 and 08. Sandy 05 and 06 joined them on the scene.: 61 The area was covered in a solid overcast, preventing visual control of air strikes by the on-scene FAC, Nail 25.
Rocky Smith and Capt. Rick Atchison coordinated the work of several F-4s who were directed to drop CBU-42 anti-personnel around Hambleton to help protect his position.: 53 When Nail 25 ran low on fuel, it was replaced by an OV-10 (Nail 38) from the flown by Capt. Henderson (Nail 38 Alpha) and 1st Lt. Mark Clark (Nail 38 Bravo, and grandson of World War II General ).
The NVA had a listening post in the area and overheard the American radio traffic. They were very familiar with American SAR tactics and on the second day they began to use the downed flyer as bait.: 76 They positioned a number of anti-aircraft and surface-to-air missiles in the area near Hambleton.
One pilot reported that 'SAM calls were driving us into the small arms threat. Ground fire was accurate and well disciplined. The NVA were very definitely monitoring and jamming our communications.'
Navy Bronco from light attack squadron VAL-4 Black Ponies attacks a target with a 5 inches (130 mm) 'Zuni' rocket in the Mekong Delta, South Vietnam, ca. Henderson obtained fixes on Hambleton's position. Coast Guard Lt.
Commander Jay Crowe, an exchange pilot on assignment to the at Da Nang, was piloting Jolly Green 65. The helicopter broke through the clouds and rapidly dropped into the area where Hambleton was hidden. The aircraft was immediately struck by a wall of North Vietnamese gunfire.
Their rounds tore through the aircraft, destroying the instrument panel. Crowe struggled to get the aircraft out of the fire zone, and with his instruments shot up, he had to rely on external visual cues to fly the aircraft. He nursed the helicopter south and was able to get to the Phu Bai airfield. Jolly Green 66 flown by Lt. Colonel Bill Harris followed, only to break through the low ceiling to face ten North Vietnamese tanks and a withering onslaught of ground fire. He fought the controls to bring his rescue helicopter within 100 yards (91 m) of Hambleton, his gunners firing the airship's three /A 7.62 mm (.308 in) six-barreled miniguns, engaging the North Vietnamese on every side.
A pilot flying support, looking for targets to engage, asked, 'Where's the enemy fire coming from?' Harris replied, 'From EVERYWHERE!' Somehow Harris managed to get his badly damaged aircraft to gain altitude, then limp back to safety.
Forced to fly in and out of cloud cover at perilously low altitudes, Nail 38, piloted by Henderson was hit by North Vietnamese fire and shot down. Henderson landed on the north side of the Song Meiu Giang, about 500 meters (1,600 ft) from Hambleton. He hid in a bamboo patch until local villagers came looking for him and cut it down. He was taken north and became a.
Bravo Times
Clark parachuted to the ground safely on the south side of river and eluded capture. Later that same day, another UH-1H slick, unrelated to the rescue operation, was shot down in the same area carrying a crew of four. After pinpointing Hambleton's location, the Air Force bombarded the area around him for the next three days. On April 4, a flight of ten Douglas A-1 Skyraiders, half the total available in all of South Vietnam, attempted to pave the way for a SAR team, and it was badly shot up.
Eight of the ten aircraft were damaged, two severely. The damage significantly affected the availability of the Skyraiders.: 85At dusk, Major Jimmy D. Kempton flying F-4D 66-0265 with the 390th TFS (Danang Gunfighters) and a wingman entered from the coast under a descending 500 foot ceiling and dropped BLU 52 SAR ordnance on four sides of Hambleton's location, the last of SAR ordnance on April 4. On April 5, bad weather prevented any SAR activity. On April 6 at 3:15 p.m., a third attempt was made to pick Hambleton and now Clark up. Four (Sandys 01, 02, 05, and 06) prepared the area around the survivors with extensive bombing and strafing.
They were assisted by two helicopters (Jolly Green 67 and Jolly Green 60) from the. During the day American fighters flew 52 sorties and four B-52 bombers bombed the area around Cam Lo. During April 6, 80 SAMs were launched by the NVA in the area around Hambleton.: 54 It was estimated that Hambleton and Clark were in the midst of five or six: 71 NVA battalions. The NVA air defense seriously challenged American air superiority and blunted the success of in the area.: 65 Capt. Peter Chapman volunteered to pilot Jolly Green 67, despite the fact that he was 'short', due to return home very soon. Boli in Sandy 01 decided they would pick up Bat 21 Bravo (Hambleton) first and Nail 38 Bravo (Clark) immediately after. At 5:10 p.m., Sandy 03 joined the group with a full load of white phosphorus that could be used to lay down a smoke screen.
Sandy 01 called in additional strikes on targets around Hambleton's position and re-checked the area. North Vietnamese response was limited. Aware that it could be a trap, he nonetheless gave the go-ahead.
As Jolly Green 67 crossed the Song Meiu Giang with Jolly Green 60 high and above guarding their approach, Jolly Green 67 began taking fire from all sides. As it approached Hambleton's position, they called for him to pop his smoke and reveal his position.
The aircraft was pummeled with automatic weapons and anti-aircraft fire from all quarters. Hambleton hesitated, and the Jolly Green tried to pull away. Despite the best efforts of the remaining aircraft, Jolly Green 67 was critically damaged.: 74 Jolly Green 67 flew east at first, further into territory held by the North Vietnamese, before it turned southeast for a few kilometers, when a fire broke out in the left engine. Pieces of the tail rotor struck the main rotor, and the aircraft rolled and crashed on its left side, burning ferociously.
No rescue beepers were heard.: 74 The entire crew was listed as and presumed killed: Capt. Peter Hayden Chapman II (pilot), Capt. John Henry Call III (co-pilot), William Roy Pearson, TSgt. Avery (para-rescuemen), TSgt.
Prater (Crew Chief), and James Harold Alley (combat photographer).: 62 The fire consuming the helicopter was so hot it melted parts of the aircraft and continued to burn for three more days. Hambleton's and Clark's spirits sank when they realized that six men died while attempting to rescue them. After a stern sermon from the new on scene commander Nail 32 Capt. John Van Etten, Hambleton decided, 'Hell, I'm going to get out of this, regardless.'
: 76 He camouflaged his hole, hiding there for seven nights and six days. He left the hole twice to scavenge for food and was almost caught the second time when he was spotted by a boy and his dog. NVA soldiers searching for him passed within 20 feet (6.1 m) of his hole twice.
The SAR task force mission leader, Capt. Fred Boli in Sandy 01, called the rescue off for the time being because it was too dangerous.
The remaining aircraft exited to the south across the Song Meiu Giang. The area was just too hot.: 62 Hambleton and Clark would have to spend another night behind the front lines. The North Vietnamese, alerted by the American's intense efforts to find the navigator, increased their efforts to find Hambleton.
NVA strength prevents air rescue All of the SAR teams were experienced in conducting rescues into what they described as 'hot ', but the airmen were shocked by the quantity and intensity of the ground and anti-aircraft fire they had faced since the rescue attempt began. This included not only small arms fire and the previously used, and towed guns, but the and towed guns, along with the self-propelled, radar-guided. Most surprising to the Americans were the large presence of SAMs, and for the first time the use of the Soviet shoulder-fired, heat-seeking SAM.: 63 Helicopter Squadron commander Lt.
Bill Harris was very upset. He concluded that the air rescue could not be attempted at that time due to the heavy concentration of North Vietnamese forces in the immediate area around Clark and Hambleton. He called Col. Muirhead and told him that they had to find another way. Hambleton was told to sit tight while they worked up an alternative plan.
Hambleton had two survival radios, a first aid kit, two kinds of flares, a knife and a.38 caliber revolver, a compass and a map, an empty water bottle, and no food.: 6 On the morning of April 7, 1st Lt. Walker accompanied by naval artillery spotter Marine Lt. Potts were flying (Covey 282) from. Potts was directing naval gunfire from the destroyer against Soviet-supplied North Vietnamese tanks to protect Hambleton.: 64 At 11:05 a.m., an pilot observed a SAM launch and Covey 282 was shot down 3 miles (4.8 km) west of Highway 1 and 4 miles (6.4 km) north of Highway 9.
Radio contact was established with both Potts and Walker, and both reported that they were uninjured, but each man was too close to North Vietnamese forces to attempt a rescue. Clark hid on the south side of the Song Meiu Giang, while Walker was about 6 kilometers (3.7 mi) north of Hambleton, who was on the north side of the river about 2 kilometers (1.2 mi) from the town of Cam Lo.: 65 Clark evaded capture for a number of days and was in contact with SAR personnel when he warned them away due to the proximity of NVA forces. In January 1992, members of the examined war artifacts in the Hanoi military museum and found Bruce Walker's ID card. The disposition and location of Potts, Walker's backseat spotter, are unknown.: 64 It was Potts' 25th birthday.: 282 Potts was wounded and captured alive, but later died in. Ground rescue. The 3rd Aerospace Rescue Recovery Group used this mosaic reconnaissance photograph to plan Lt.
Hambleton and 1st Lt. Mark Clark’s rescue. The Cam Lo Bridge is shown at the far left.
On April 7, Hambleton was about 1,000 yards (910 m) above the river and Clark was near the river.: 76 After five days and multiple attempts to rescue Hambleton, five aircraft had been shot down and another 16 seriously damaged,: 68 10 service members had been killed or were missing in action, two were, and two were behind front lines also waiting to be rescued. On April 8, Gen. Was briefed on the high losses in the several failed attempts to rescue Hambleton and Clark. He ordered that no further air CSAR would be attempted, but that given Hambleton's Top Secret clearance and knowledge of missiles and counter-measure technology, that every effort should be made to bring him out. Suggested a covert, land-based rescue operation.
Andy Anderson, Commander of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC, MACVSOG-80) ordered a ground rescue. In Saigon, Lt., one of just three SEAL officers and nine enlisted men remaining in Vietnam, had just completed an assignment in the. He was waiting for orders when the call came in for a commando operation to get Hambleton out.
Norris was immediately dispatched to lead an operation to rescue Hambleton. He recruited five Vietnamese Sea Commando from the Lien Doc Nguoi Nhia (LDNN), Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD) in Da Nang. Brigadier General gave Anderson a Ranger platoon of about 20 men and three tanks that they used to set up a forward operating base along Highway QL-9 within observation range of the strategic Cam Lo Bridge.: 67 But Giai thought that the mission was insane and refused to take responsibility for the mission once they crossed the Song Meiu Giang.
Anderson, who spoke Vietnamese, obtained additional intelligence from the headquarters of the 1st Armor Brigade near Dong Ha.: 239 Ad hoc code used The U.S. Rescuers knew that the North Vietnamese were monitoring radio communications and understood English. Clark and Hambleton were several miles apart. A forward air controller told Clark, who was from Idaho, to 'Get to the, make like and float to.'
In other words, get to the river and swim east. Hambleton had a much more difficult task—to bypass North Vietnamese-occupied villages and gun emplacements. His rescuers learned that he was one of the best golfers in the Air Force and that he retained a detailed memory of the golf courses he had played. Improvising a code using a series of specific golf-course holes to guide him through the mine fields sown to protect him and to get him to the Song Meiu Giang, they radioed him, 'You're going to play 18 holes and you're going to get in the and make like and.
The round starts on No. Hambleton initially replied, 'What have you been smoking?'
But he broke the code. 'It took me a half-hour to figure out they were giving me distance and direction,' Hambleton explained. Autodata diagnostic trouble codes 2011.
1 at Tucson National is 408 yards running southeast. They wanted me to move southeast 400 yards. The 'course' would lead me to water.' Using the golf-course code, he was directed towards the Song Meiu Giang.
To save time, Hambleton passed through the abandoned village that concealed the guns that shot down his would-be rescuers. Although the village had been bombed, he was confronted by a North Vietnamese soldier. Hambleton killed him using a knife in hand-to-hand combat. At one point, he was given directions to a 'refreshment stand' where he would have to 'tap his own keg'. Physically exhausted, hungry and dehydrated, Hambleton found a plantation where he could tap the tree for drinking water. He got lost briefly, and then fell off a cliff, breaking his arm.: 24 The U.S. Command in Saigon ordered special high-altitude bombing raids on nearby targets to divert the Vietnamese from searching for the two men, who were several miles apart.
Commandos cross lines.
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